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1 Introduction
The regulation debate has posed two polar price rules for an industry mo-
nopolist. Productive eﬃciency is achieved by price cap regulation, in which
the ﬁrm is the residual claimant of cost-savings made within a period, and
allocative eﬃciency is achieved by cost-plus regulation, which allows the ﬁrm
to receive a speciﬁed rate of return by enabling the price to shadow costs.
Both rules have been used at various times to set prices in regulated utilities,
in a variety of countries. The development, and widespread application, of
RPI-X price cap regulation in the UK is widely regarded as a signiﬁcant in-
novation in regulatory practice (see Armstrong et al. (1994)). However, such
∗We are grateful for valuable comments received on earlier drafts at the 25th Annual
IAEE Conference in Aberdeen, Scotland June 2002) and at seminars hosted by the Uni-
versity of Barcelona (March 2003), the Centre for Energy Policy and Economics (cepe),
Zurich Institute of Technology, Switzerland (June 2002) and the Department of Economics
at the University of Portsmouth, England (October 2002). Remaining errors and omissions
are our own.
†Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC), Department of Economics, University of
Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, UK.
‡Surrey Energy Economics Centre (SEEC), Department of Economics, University of
Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH, UK and CEPR.mechanisms have not gone unchallenged, by policy-makers or academics.
Government publications (see DTI (1999)) and regulatory price reviews in
energy and water have all asked whether modiﬁcations to RPI-X would be
appropriate (e.g. OFFER (1999a), OFFER (1999b)) in order to “incentivise
regulation”, as one commentator has suggested (see Utilities Journal (2000)).
The recent review of electricity distribution price regulation (see OFGEM
(2004b); Pollitt (2005) for a commentary) contains several mechanisms to
achieve this, within an overall RPI-X price cap framework.
Any incentive scheme must address the principal-agent problem faced
by the principal (the regulator). Optimal incentive schemes, designed to
take account of information asymmetries, involve a menu of contracts that
force the ﬁrm to surrender its private information (Laﬀont and Tirole (1993),
Weyman-Jones (1995), Burns et al. (1998)).1 These schemes can be regarded
as ‘sliding scale regulation’ because they allow higher cost ﬁrms to share more
of this cost with consumers through a higher regulated price: they provide
an intermediate point between the high-power incentives under price cap reg-
ulation and the low-power incentives of cost-plus regulation. Unfortunately,
there has only been limited research on such schemes, perhaps because they
may be complex to construct and necessarily hard to evaluate.2 The purpose
of this paper is to consider these two issues and, as a result, to compare opti-
mal and simple forms of regulating an industry monopolist when productivity
and managerial eﬀort are not observed.
In order to address the regulator’s problem under asymmetric informa-
tion, we draw upon Laﬀont and Tirole (1993). We amend this for the case of
1See Jamasb et al. (2004) for interesting conﬁrmation of the importance of asymmetric
information and strategic behaviour in the context of electricity regulation.
2Anticipating the current paper, Laﬀont and Tirole (1993), p. 155, observe that:
“...much work remains to be done, ..., it would be worthwhile to further analyze the
propertiesofandtocalibratetheoptimalslidingscale...”.
2electricity distribution, then show how to operationalise their general model
in order to construct a sliding scale form of regulation for electricity distri-
bution where contracts are oﬀered linking the regulated price to observed
costs.3 Having shown how to construct the sliding scale, we seek to compare
the welfare eﬀects of such regulation with those of a stylised price cap (based
on Gasmi et al. (1994)). We perform simulations where the key parameter
values are estimated using demand and cost data from the distribution ac-
tivities of the electricity supply industry in England and Wales. Because
the industry was divided into twelve Regional Electricity Companies (RECs)
upon restructuring in 1990, it provides a convenient panel for performing
such analysis.4 As a result, we are able to compute for each REC, a mean-
ingful estimate of the welfare gain available from moving between a price cap
and optimal (static) price regulation in distribution.5 We ﬁnd that, when the
regulator designs both mechanisms to cover almost all possible distribution
costs for a given REC, and when she faces a relatively severe asymmetric in-
formation problem, signiﬁcant welfare gains may be available from the sliding
scale.
Other authors have compared the welfare eﬀects of diﬀerent incentive
schemes using simulation; see Gasmi et al. (2002). Schmalensee (1989) con-
3Burns et al. (1998) make a case for sliding scale regulation and compare this with
alternative regimes. In constructing the latter they consider the simpler case where trans-
fers take place between the regulator and the industry. By contrast, we consider price
regulation in the absence of any such transfer.
4Although our data pre-date recent changes to the regional structure of electricity
supply (see Green and McDaniel (1998)), our focus on regional monopolies in distribution
(by what are now termed Distribution Network Operators, rather than RECs) remains
highly relevant to current arrangements (see OFGEM (2000), OFGEM (2004b)). We
continue to refer to ‘RECs’ to be consistent with our data.
5It should be made clear that our intention is not to test predictions from the model, or
to supplement any of the body of empirical work seeking to evaluate the results of electric-
ity privatisation (e.g. Newbery and Pollitt (1997), Green and McDaniel (1998), Newbery
(1998), Wolfram (1998), Green (1999), Wolfram (1999), Domah and Pollitt (2001)).
3trasts diﬀerent linear mechanisms (where the regulated ﬁrm receives a ﬁxed
percentage cost-reimbursement). He uses sensitivity analysis with a selected
range of parameter values. This approach is also adopted by Gasmi et al.
(1994), where optimal regulation, price caps and a version of proﬁt-sharing
are compared in a model where the regulator is able to make lump-sum
transfers to the ﬁrm. An important contribution of our work is to extend
this analysis to optimal (linear) price regulation in the absence of such trans-
fers. Of course, the practical merits of simulations are inﬂuenced by the
plausibility of the parameter values used. Accordingly, Gasmi et al. (1997)
calibrate a model of regulation in the US local exchange telecommunications
market in order to examine empirically the form of the optimal regulatory
mechanism. Using an engineering process model to estimate ﬁrms’ (translog)
cost functions, they look for evidence of natural monopoly and the degree
to which regulatory mechanisms must be adjusted for ﬁrms’ private infor-
mation. Their paper is closely related to ours in its attempt to generate
empirically meaningful values for the model’s key parameters. Our approach
and focus diﬀer, however. Rather than use engineering data to construct a
detailed cost function, we use economic data on costs, outputs and prices for
RECs over time to estimate simpliﬁed cost and demand functions for each
REC. This has the beneﬁt of enabling us to estimate standard errors which
proxy the regulator’s degree of uncertainty about ﬁrms’ cost functions, some-
thing that has not been done before. Then, having shown how to construct
optimal linear price regulation without transfers, we use our empirical results
to compare this with the welfare eﬀects of a simple price cap.
In practice, OFGEM’s procedure for setting regulated prices diﬀers from
our own model in two broad respects (see Pollitt (2005)). First, OFGEM
takes considerable eﬀort to reduce the eﬀects of asymmetric information
4by auditing ﬁrms, collecting cost (and other) data from them and making
appropriate adjustments to the data. This is a resource-intensive process
for both regulator and ﬁrms yet asymmetries inevitably persist (see Jamasb
et al. (2004)). Second, ﬁrms’ cost/composite-output combinations are bench-
marked against each other in order to identify relative eﬃciencies. At this
point, price caps are set for the individual ﬁrms for the following period with
an initial adjustment in price (i.e. the “P0”s for each ﬁrm) followed by a
RPI-X cap for all ﬁrms in the remaining (four) years. The initial P0s are
intended to encourage greater eﬃciency.
In this paper, we focus on the information asymmetries that remain (as
Jamasb et al. suggest) following the above process. Our stylised price cap ab-
stracts from benchmarking issues: in eﬀect, ﬁrms are assumed to be adopting
the most eﬃcient technology and inputs. Thus, our comparison of the sliding
scale and the stylised price cap under asymmetric information addresses the
issue of how regulated prices should be set when information gathering is
imperfect.6
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the
model we use and solves the First-Best case where the ﬁrm possesses no
private information. Section 3 derives the optimal sliding scale price regime
relating the regulated price to observed costs. We show how this scheme can
be computed from a set of diﬀerential equations with initial and terminal
boundary conditions. Section 4 derives the price cap regime, and notes its
incentive properties relative to the sliding scale. Section 5 then explains
how we estimate the parameters necessary for the welfare comparison of the
distribution price cap and sliding scale for the electricity industry in England
6In principle, the paper also provides an alternative method for addressing information
asymmetries. In turn, this raises the question of how much resource needs to be invested
in the existing regulatory review process. We return to this issue in the Conclusion.
5and Wales, before presenting the results of our simulations. The ﬁnal section
(Section 6) concludes, brieﬂy assesses other elements of the schemes we have
studied and highlights several aspects of the analysis that warrant future
research.
2 A model of price regulation in electricity
distribution
This paper seeks to examine the general question of how optimal price reg-
ulation compares with stylised price cap regulation in the presence of asym-
metric information. Given that the data used in Section 5 are drawn from
electricity distribution, it is important that our model reﬂects this setting.
Production of electricity typically consists of four functions: generation,
transmission, distribution and supply. The economic characteristics of these
functions mean that some can be opened up to competition more readily
than others. In England and Wales, generation and supply have gradually
become more competitive since restructuring and privatisation, while trans-
mission and distribution have remained subject to price regulation. Since we
examine optimal price regulation based on Laﬀont and Tirole (1993)’s model
of consumer price regulation, we must ﬁrst consider whether any amendments
are necessary when regulating an upstream component of consumer price.
To this end, note that the electricity retail price (p) is primarily the sum
of the contributions of the four components described above, generation (g),
transmission (t), distribution (d) and supply (s): i.e. p = g +t+d+s.7 The
issue for us is then whether a relationship between p and d can be expected
to exist and how it might be modelled. On the ﬁrst point, it is clear from
7These four elements account for about 90% of p; see OFGEM (2004a), Figure 4.2.
6OFGEM (2004b) (e.g. see the Summary) that the regulator recognizes a
positive relationship between d and p and that we should therefore include
this. On the second point, it is again apparent from OFGEM (2004b) that,
with the exception of pass-through for certain upstream costs, much of the
regulator’s analysis takes the other sectors’ prices and costs as given when
setting distribution prices. We shall, thus, make a similar assumption: letting
z ≡ g + t + s, we assume that z is taken as exogenous in the setting of d.
As a result, if q is the ﬁnal output and p = P(q) is the inverse retail demand
curve, we can write d(q)=P(q) − z.8
Consider the regulation of a regional natural monopolist in electricity
distribution, supplying q units of electricity for sale on the downstream retail
market. The retail price is a uniform (linear) price p = d + z, and the
demand curve is q = D(p)=D(d+z); the inverse demand curve is as above
p = P(q) ⇔ d(q)=P(q) − z.9 Total distribution costs, consisting of ﬁxed
and variable costs, are separately observed by the regulator and given by
C(e,q)=α + c(e,q;β)( 1 )
where e is cost-reducing eﬀort (Ce < 0), q is output, α are ﬁxed costs and
β is a productivity parameter reﬂecting factors exogenous to the distributor
that aﬀect costs (Cq > 0,C β > 0). In principle, β may be stochastic and
change over time. Importantly, however, we assume that the ﬁrm observes
the realisation of β before the regulator announces contracts. Once these
8Future research might interestingly consider the eﬀects of relaxing this partial equi-
librium approach to take into account interactions between the four principal components
of price. For the present paper, however, our assumption provides a tractable starting
point for modelling distribution price regulation. As we have suggested, it also ﬁnds some
support in recent regulation.
9Non-linear prices are also common in the electricity retail market. See Wilson (1993)
for analysis of non-linear alternatives.
7contracts are announced, the ﬁrm chooses e. The regulator observes neither
eﬀort nor the productivity parameter and, thus, faces both an adverse selec-
tion and moral hazard problem.10 The regulator does, however, observe ﬁnal
costs (C) and knows that β is continuously distributed on the interval [β,β]
with density function f(β).
Single-period payoﬀs for the ﬁrm and regulator are
U(e,q)=R(q) − C(e,q) − ψ(e)( 2 )
W(e,q)=B(q) − R(q)+U (3)
In (2), ψ(e) is the disutility of eﬀort to the ﬁrm (where we assume ψ ,ψ   > 0
for e>0a n dψ(e) = 0 otherwise). In (3), B(q) is the gross consumer
surplus from consuming the REC’s electricity, R(q)=pq is the revenue and
B(q) − R(q)i st h en e tc o n s u m e rs u r p l u s .
2.1 The First-Best (complete information)
A useful comparator for later results is provided by assuming that the regula-
tor has complete information. This ‘First-Best’ can be reached when the reg-
ulator observes the productivity parameter β. Then she maximizes (3) with
respect to q and e, given the individual rationality (IR) constraint U ≥ 0.
10To give some speciﬁc examples, the electricity regulator may not be able to distin-
guish high costs caused by diﬃcult (perhaps stochastic) distribution conditions (OFGEM
(2004b), para. 3.18, contrasts “known” and “unknown” items of cost) or by poor man-
agerial eﬀort. Elsewhere, the rail regulator may not be able to tell if high costs genuinely
result from “leaves on the line” for a particular train operating company (TOC). The
ﬁrms, in contrast may well know what has inﬂuenced their costs. Of course, correlation
across distributors or TOCs may provide useful information here (and allow some element
of benchmarking) but we ignore this by assuming the βs to be independently distributed
across ﬁrms. We recognise that the modelling of interdependence remains important fu-
ture work. Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) examine interdependence in a model with lump-sum
transfers rather than price regulation, while Auriol and Laﬀont (1993) do so in a model
with no cost-reducing eﬀort.
8The well-known solution (see Appendix A) involves optimal eﬀort when the
marginal disutility of eﬀort equals its marginal beneﬁt (ψ (e)=−Ce), Ram-
sey distribution pricing and zero rent (i.e. IR binds).
3 Incomplete information and sliding scale
regulation
Now assume that neither the REC’s productivity parameter (β) nor eﬀort
(e) can be observed by the regulator but price, demand, marginal and ﬁxed
costs are observed.11 Let ρ = U + ψ(e) be the total transfer received by the
ﬁrm via the consumer. Then, combining (1) and (2), we can write
(d + z − Cq)D(d + z) − α = ρ = U + ψ(e)( 4 )
and let d(Cq,ρ,α) be the lowest distribution price satisfying this equation,
where Cq = ∂C/∂q is the marginal distribution cost. Write the net con-
sumer surplus as Bn(d(Cq,ρ,α)+z). The regulator now designs a menu





11 Assuming that other parameters (e.g. γ, η from Section 3.1 below) are the ﬁrm’s
private information would add signiﬁcantly to complexity without necessarily altering our
main qualitative results (see Laﬀont et al. (1987)).
9where ρ = U + ψ(e), subject to incentive compatibility constraints (IC) and





 (e(β)); Cqβ ≥ 0( 6 )
IR : U(β) ≥ 0( 7 )
The result of this optimization is obtained by standard optimal control
techniques (see Laﬀont and Tirole (1993), p. 152) and is given by
ψ
 (e(β)) = q(β) −
 β
β [∂d/∂Cq − 1]f(˜ β)d˜ β
(∂d/∂Cq)f(β)
ψ
  (e(β)) (8)





 (e(˜ β))d˜ β (9)
Then price and output follow from the ﬁrm’s budget constraint (4) and q =
D(d + z). Eﬀort under asymmetric information is less than that under the
First-Best (compare (8) and (A.2) from Appendix A).
3.1 Implementation of the sliding scale
The relationship d = p − z, equations (4), (8), (9), ρ = U + ψ(e), Cq =
Cq(e,q;β)a n dq = D(p) give seven equations in p(β),e(β),U(β), ρ(β),
Cq(β)a n dq(β) given functional forms D(·),ψ(·)a n df(·). In fact given
{d(β),C q(β)} the rest of the solution is uniquely deﬁned. It follows that a
12The IC constraint is the familiar one derived in Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) and describes
each type of ﬁrm’s ﬁrst- and second-order conditions for truth-telling: eﬀectively, rent must
be allowed to evolve at the same rate as a low-cost ﬁrm loses utility from foregoing its
chance to mimic high-cost counterparts. Since IC requires dU/dβ < 0, we can infer that
when β’s IR constraint is satisﬁed, so are all other ﬁrms’. This is captured in (7).
10contract consisting of a cost-contingent menu {d(β),C q(β)} implements the
optimal solution. The IC constraint ensures that the ﬁrm with productivity
β chooses the correct contract designed for its type. Expressing the price as
a function of cost for each β gives the sliding scale d = d(Cq). An example of
this solution is given in Figures 1a and 1b (discussed further below). For a
very ineﬃcient ﬁrm a reduction in cost is matched by an almost one-for-one
reduction in price. For a very eﬃcient ﬁrm the scheme almost resembles a
price cap.13
Our system of equations as it stands contains two integral equations which
are not straightforward to solve, even numerically. However we can transform
the system into six ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equations in e(β), U(β), p(β), k(β),
f(β)a n dW(β), where k(β) is deﬁned in (11) below. These are amenable to
numerical solution techniques so we proceed to do this.
On the demand-side, we specify D(p)=Ap−η,w h e r eA represents the
‘scale’ (including income eﬀects) of demand and η>0 is the (absolute value
of) the price elasticity of demand. On the supply-side, we specify c(e,q;β)=














i.e. a normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ. Clearly,
our simulations in Section 5 depend on the empirical validity of these as-
sumptions. The constant elasticity demand function is standard in energy
demand estimation (e.g. Pesaran et al. (1998)).14 We check for the nor-
13If β is stochastic but observed by the ﬁrm before choosing its {p,Cq} combination (as
described above), then the sliding scale allows ﬁrms to react to the realisations of β they
actually observe.
14This speciﬁcation is typically favoured for its simplicity, straightforward interpretation
and limited data requirements. Moreover, Pesaran et al. (1998) ﬁnd that it generally
11mality of the β-distribution when we estimate the cost function in Section
5. The remaining assumptions are addressed ﬁrst in Appendix B, where we
show how a more general disutility of eﬀort function and a cost function that
is non-linear in eﬀort generate a cost function that is non-linear in output.
Section 5 then tests this against our chosen cost function. Both here, and in
the case of f(β), our data are consistent with the above functional forms.





D(p)+( p − ˆ c)D (p)
≡ k(β) (11)












e(˜ β)d˜ β (13)



























which returns us to the original IC condition. Diﬀerentiating (4), (11) and



















outperforms more complex speciﬁcations across a large variety of settings.
12Substituting D(p)=Ap−η, D (p)=−ηD(p)/p, k(β) deﬁned in (11) becomes
k =
p
p(1 − η)+ηˆ c
(17)
Hence diﬀerentiating and putting dˆ c
dβ =1− de
























Social welfare can be incorporated within the system of diﬀerential equa-
tions as follows. With a demand function given by D(p)=Ap−η the net
















Note that if η<1, which turns out to be the case for the majority of our
empirical results, the net consumer surplus is only deﬁned if we impose a price
ceiling, p = pmax. However we can subtract the troublesome constant ﬁrst
term in (20) from our deﬁnition of net consumer surplus without changing
the relative welfare performance of the regimes. In what follows we report















n(p(˜ β)) + U(˜ β)]f(˜ β)d˜ β (22)




n(p(β)) + U(β)]f(β) (23)
which, using (20), can be added to the system of diﬀerential equations. Note
the additional boundary condition W(β) = 0. Deﬁne the row vector vT =
[eUpkfW]. Then (14), (15), (16), (18), (19) and (23) can be written as the




= B(v); β ∈ [β,β] (24)
The relationship for the distribution price, d(β)=p(β) − z then completes
the set of equations for the sliding scale.
The boundary conditions are at both ends of the interval [β,β]. At β = β
we have from (12) that e = D(p)/γ (i.e. eﬀort is at the socially optimal level
for the eﬃcient ﬁrm). At β = β we have U(β) = 0. We solve this problem
numerically using MATLAB.15 Before presenting our results, however, we
ﬁrst obtain an appropriate version of price cap regulation with which to
compare the sliding scale.
15See Appendix C; the full programs are available from the authors on request.
144 Price cap regulation
We wish to compare the optimal scheme described above with a stylised
example of price cap regulation. While various forms of price capping ar-
rangement can be observed (for example, RPI-X regulation), their distin-
guishing feature is that the regulated price is not conditioned on realised
cost or managerial eﬀort; our stylised price cap (which follows that in Gasmi
et al. (1994)) captures this feature.16
The stylised price cap regime is obtained as follows. A single price is
set that will satisfy the IR condition for all ﬁrms. This means setting the
price at p to ensure U = 0. Then, given the price, each ﬁrm will choose the
optimal level of eﬀort. Given (2) and our assumptions about c(e,q;β)a n d
ψ(e), it is clear that when the price cap binds, the distribution and retail
prices, output, eﬀort and cost are respectively given by
d = p − z





ˆ c = β − e
Note that, unlike the sliding scale, the price cap provides incentives for First-
Best eﬀort. As eﬃciencyβ rises, the price arrives at the monopoly price for
16A scheme like RPI-X price capping has several additional features (in addition to the
broad diﬀerences discussed in the Introduction). These include the choice of X-factors
(Bernstein and Sappington (1999), Bernstein and Sappington (2000)), various cost pass-
through dispensations that regulators may allow, matters of tariﬀ rebalancing that might
take place in a multi-product monopoly (Armstrong et al. (1995)) and intertemporal issues
(Dobbs (2004)).
15that level of productivity and then the ﬁrm acts as an unregulated monopoly
for higher values of the productivity parameter (see Laﬀont and Tirole (1993),
p. 154).
5 Estimation and simulation
Having characterised the optimal form of static price regulation and a simple
price cap, we now wish to compare the welfare eﬀects of the two using sim-
ulations. Because results here depend on the choice of parameter values, we
attempt to estimate the parameters of interest from demand and cost data
taken from electricity distribution in England and Wales. This allows our
simulations to use suitable parameter values for the industry in question and
enables us to estimate the degree of technological uncertainty (β) faced by
the regulator. We ﬁrst explain our approach to estimating the demand- and
supply-sides of the model.
5.1 Method
On the supply-side of the model, we observe variable and ﬁxed costs (αi)
separately for each REC i. From Section 4, variable distribution costs are
given by
Vi =( βi − ei)qi (25)
Eﬀort is not observed, so an assumption about its derivation is needed. We
therefore assume that the actual regime currently in place approximates to a
price cap, i.e. RPI-X regulation. Then eﬀort chosen by rent-maximising REC
i is given by ei = qi/γ.17 Substituting into (25), and allowing for variation
17As noted in Section 4, price caps are distinguished by the independence of price from
realised cost and eﬀort. As such, given (1) and (2), any price cap regime would produce
16over time, the following cross-sectional equation for average variable costs in








βiτ = bi + uiτ (27)
where the zero-mean disturbance in (27), uiτ, is a REC-speciﬁc shock to βi
at time τ (observed by the REC).
For the demand-side, the relationship q = D(d+z) is estimated. Suppose
that we have the estimated long-run demand relationship in log-linear form:
log(qi)=ai − ηi log(pi)w h e r eai may contain other variables, but these are
exogenous from the viewpoint of the industry regulator. Putting Ai = eai,




for the ith REC. Here, qi represents total electricity demand for REC i and
ηi is the absolute value of the long-run price elasticity of demand for this
REC. Notice that since Ai and ηi are diﬀerent for each REC we construct a
diﬀerent sliding scale for each REC.
5.2 Estimation results
5.2.1 Estimation of average variable costs
Equations (26) and (27) represent a static model of average variable costs
to be estimated for electricity distribution in England and Wales. Letting
the eﬀort level given by this equation. It is, therefore, reasonable to use data from actual
practice to estimate our price cap model.
17yi = Vi/qi, ξ = −(1/γ), then (26) and (27) can be written as
yiτ = bi + ξqiτ + uiτ (29)
which can be estimated by least squares dummy variables.18,19 The data set
covers the period 1990/91 to 1999/2000 and thus, spans the period since
privatisation. Full details about the data are given in Appendix D.
Over the historic period many other factors are likely to have impacted
on average operating costs including the severity of the regulatory regime,
ownership changes amongst the RECs, changes in environmental legislation,
and so on. Failure to include these may produce biased estimates of the
desired coeﬃcients. This problem is primarily dealt with by use of group
eﬀects (i.e. dummy constants for each REC) plus an allowance for time
eﬀects. Two approaches are considered: time dummy variables and a time
trend. In addition, in order to check the (derived) linearity of (29), both
approaches test for the presence of a squared term in output (q2). The
general model is therefore:
yiτ = bi + ξqiτ + κq
2
iτ + REC eﬀects + time eﬀects + uiτ (30)
18We assume that E(qiτ,u iτ) = 0, for unbiasedness when estimating (29). Since shocks
to qiτ must come from the demand-side of the model, and since we interpret uiτ as a
supply-side shock, unbiasedness would arise from demand and supply shocks being un-
correlated. In general, this seems reasonable. Another potential source of bias could be
output measurement error. To the extent that our output data are collected to satisfy
regulatory, as well as private, requirements (see Appendix D), we feel that scrutiny of
measured/reported ﬁgures will have helped to address this.
19Our procedure estimates a conﬁdence interval for γ, while we have assumed the regula-
tor knows γ with certainty in the model (the same is true for η below). This suggests that
the procedure would be appropriate for a more complex setting where, say, γ is also private
information. However, to the extent that a more complex setting need not qualitatively
alter our results (see n. 11), we believe our estimating procedure remains valid.
18where ‘time eﬀects’ are either time dummies or a time trend.
The results for the general model with time dummies are presented as
speciﬁcation C1 in Table 1. The coeﬃcient for q has the expected sign and is
signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The coeﬃcient for q2 also has the expected sign
but is insigniﬁcant at standard signiﬁcance levels. In addition, the equation
fails the two diagnostic tests for functional form (RESET) and normality.
The results from removing the q2 variable are presented as speciﬁcation C2
in Table 1. As expected the coeﬃcient on q falls but remains signiﬁcant at
the 1% level and the normality test is now passed at the 5% level. However,
the RESET test is still not passed at conventional levels of signiﬁcance.
The results for the general model with the time trend are presented as
speciﬁcation C3 in Table 1. Again the coeﬃcient on q has the expected sign
and is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The coeﬃcient for q2 also has the expected
sign and is signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The time trend is not signiﬁcant at
conventional levels. For this equation the functional form test is passed at
the 5% level, but there is evidence of non-normality. When the q2 term is
removed—speciﬁcation C4 in Table 1—both the RESET and the normality
tests are passed at the 5% level. In addition the q coeﬃcient remains very
signiﬁcant with the expected sign, while the time trend, although negative
as expected, is very insigniﬁcant. Overall, this speciﬁcation ensures that the
important diagnostic tests for our speciﬁcation of (1), ψ(e)a n df(β)a r e
passed. Accordingly, it is the one used in the simulations below.
Table 1 about here
The ﬁnal step is to calculate the range of uncertainty faced by the reg-
ulator when seeking to assess each REC’s cost; this is something that our
19estimation approach allows us to consider. Equation (26) takes the value of
γ as ﬁxed so we focus on the uncertainty surrounding the βis. These are
found from the standard error estimates of the REC eﬀects in model C4
and are presented in columns (3)–(6) of Table 3 at the end of this section;
these present the range of uncertainty for 95% and 99% conﬁdence intervals
(Ranges 1 and 2 respectively). These can be used to construct upper and
lower bounds for each βi. Thus, in the case of REC 1 for example, the regu-
lator can estimate β1 to be 2.58. However, with 95% conﬁdence this will fall
between 2.00 (a shock that lowers the REC’s costs) and 3.17 (implying an
adverse shock to costs). Naturally, the 99% conﬁdence intervals take account
of even greater potential shocks to costs.
5.2.2 Estimation of electricity demand
Estimation of (28) requires speciﬁcation of the exogenous variables that are
likely to have aﬀected regional electricity demand in England and Wales. One
approach would be to estimate a separate demand function for each company,
but this would require a lengthy time-series for each of the required variables.
Instead, we exploit a panel of data on regional electricity demand. The panel
covers all twelve RECs for the period 1982/83 to 1996/97. We estimate the
following long run panel model:
logqiτ = ai+(ω+δi)logpiτ+σ loghiτ+ζ logqiτ−1+REC eﬀects + time eﬀects
where logqiτ is the logarithm of electricity demand for each REC, logpiτ is
the logarithm of the real price of electricity, and loghiτ is the logarithm of
real GDP in region i at time τ.20 As with the cost function, two ways of
20A more general model allowing for a diﬀerent income elasticity of demand for each
REC could have been employed. However, given the nature of the simulation exercise
20incorporating the time eﬀects were initially considered: either time dummies
or a time trend. In addition, given the longer time series available for the
demand estimation a lagged dependent variable was included. The estimated
coeﬃcients are given in Table 2 and the implied long run elasticities are
reported in Table 3 (column 8).
Table 2 about here
Speciﬁcation D1 incorporates time dummies whereas speciﬁcation D2 in-
corporates the time trend. The results for D2 are poor, failing the serial
correlation and the functional form (RESET) tests. Moreover, the price elas-
ticity estimates are poorly deﬁned. Therefore the model with a time trend
is not considered further. However, for speciﬁcation D1 the price elasticities
are generally well deﬁned, other than that for REC 8 where the coeﬃcient on
logp8 is positive but very insigniﬁcant. In addition, speciﬁcation D1 passes
the serial correlation and RESET tests, but there are some problems with
non-normality. Therefore, a number of outliers were identiﬁed and dummy
variables included in the model, with the results presented as speciﬁcation
D3 in Table 2. The inclusion of the dummies solves the non-normality prob-
lem with all other diagnostic tests passed. Again the price elasticities are
generally well deﬁned other than that for REC 8. Thus, to ensure η>0i n
this case, the long run price elasticity for REC 8 was constrained to -0.05
and the results presented as speciﬁcation D4 in Table 2. This passes all di-
agnostic tests, with the test for the imposed price elasticity accepted by the
data. Moreover, all coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 5% level other than the
and the limited number of observations a constant income elasticity across all RECs was
assumed.
21price coeﬃcient for REC 10, which is signiﬁcant at 14% only. In addition
speciﬁcation D4 has sensible income and price elasticity estimates with the
long-run price elasticities ranging from -0.05 for REC 8 to -1.15 for REC 12.
Therefore the coeﬃcients from speciﬁcation D4 are used below. A summary
of all the parameter values needed for our simulations is given in Table 3.
Table 3 about here
5.3 Simulation results
We have performed simulations and welfare comparisons for each REC (Table
4). However, it is useful to begin by considering a given REC in more detail.
Thus, Figures 1 to 4 display results for a representative REC (REC 1). As
described above, we design a sliding scale for two possible ranges of β:a
‘narrow’ range, where β is assumed to lie within a 95% conﬁdence interval of
the estimated value (i.e. Range 1), and a ‘wide’ range, where β is assumed
to lie within a 99% conﬁdence interval of its estimated value (i.e. Range
2), thereby capturing 99 percent of the possible values of β. These ranges
represent the regulator’s uncertainty as to the true value of β. In the ﬁgures
we compare the sliding scale, stylised price cap and First-Best regimes for
REC 1 for the narrow range; similar ﬁgures, qualitative results and discussion
can be provided for the wide range and for all the RECs.
To begin, Figure 1 depicts the sliding scale computed for REC 1. As
explained earlier, this is increasing in the REC’s marginal cost and ranges
from a virtual price cap to almost complete cost-reimbursement as this cost
increases. As a result, depending on its observation of β, the REC can select
a price-cost combination from the menu oﬀered. As is common in these
models, the convexity of the sliding scale means that it can be approximated
22by a menu of linear contracts linking ﬁnal price to an agreed share of marginal
cost to be borne by the ﬁrm.
Despite the sliding scale rising as conditions render the REC less cost-
eﬃcient, Figure 2 demonstrates that the overall transfer (ρ = U + ψ(e))
from consumers to the ﬁrm, still falls as β rises. This is further conﬁrmed
in Figure 3 which depict, inter alia, rent and cost-reducing eﬀort under the
sliding scale regime. Rent falls as β rises (as required by IC), with eﬀort also
falling in order for the regulator to extract rent from the more eﬃcient of the
potential RECs.21
Figure 3 also contains important information relevant to the welfare com-
parison between the sliding scale and the alternative regimes we consider: the
stylised price cap and First-Best (full-information) pricing. Thus, while rent
under the latter scheme is clearly zero, we can see that it is higher under
the price cap than either of the others. The reason for this is that the price
cap makes no adjustment to eﬀorts in order to extract rent from RECs if the
REC experiences a low realisation of β: the REC is a residual claimant of
any cost savings. The ﬁgure also conﬁrms (as we have already seen) that ef-
fort, which is the same under the First Best and the price cap, will be higher
in these regimes compared to the sliding scale; i.e. ceteris paribus ﬁrms will
work harder to push down costs than under the sliding scale. Under the price
cap, this again reﬂects the added incentive to cut costs.
Our ﬁnal ﬁgure (Figure 4) compares distribution prices under the three
regimes. Naturally, the First-Best price is lowest (and increases with β),
reﬂecting the regulator’s ability to force down observable costs and match
prices to them. Similarly, the price under the stylised price cap is highest, in
21Lower eﬀort from high-β RECs means that low-β ﬁrms who mimic need to be reim-
bursed for smaller levels of disutility of eﬀort.
23order to cover the REC’s highest expected cost (within the relevant β-range).
The sliding-scale price lies between the two, again reﬂecting the regulator’s
desire to trade rent for cost-reducing incentives.
For our estimated parameter values the sliding-scale price in fact closely
tracks the First Best which suggests that the welfare outcome of the sliding
scale should not be too far away from the optimal welfare. To quantify the
welfare eﬀects, we examine the beneﬁts of sliding scale versus the stylised





where wel(i),i= ss,pc,fb is the social welfare under the sliding scale, price
cap and First-Best regimes respectively. Thus, since wel(fb) >w e l (ss) >
wel(pc), G ∈ (0,1). G is a measure of how much better the sliding scale
regime is in relation to the price cap in solving the asymmetric information
problem. Our results for all twelve RECs are contained in Table 4. For each
range, it is apparent that the welfare gains from the sliding scale vary some-
what, although the average gains are appreciable. Thus, given asymmetric
information, the Range 1 sliding scale makes up roughly 55% (on average) of
the welfare loss under the price cap. As anticipated above, this improvement
increases (to 63% on average) as we move to the wider Range 2: when the
regulator seeks to cover greater productivity diﬀerences, the price cap rises
and the sliding scale’s performance improves. An implication of this is that
smaller beneﬁts will accrue to the sliding scale if the regulator designs policy
for only a narrow range of possible eﬃciencies. As explained above, the wel-
fare gain comes about because the sliding scale allows the regulator to trade
rent and productivity in a way that the price cap prevents. When comparing
the values of G across RECs, it is notable that the smallest gains tend to
24be associated with small elasticities of demand (RECS 8 and 10) because in
these cases the higher distribution price in the price cap regimes depresses
the consumer surplus by less. As a consequence of this the sliding scale price
follows the price cap more closely and in fact very closely for REC 8 where
the elasticity is almost zero.
Table 4 about here
6 Conclusions
We have shown how a sliding scale regulation scheme linking the regulated
price to observed marginal cost can be constructed. Data from the twelve
UK RECs (as they were called during our data period) have been used to
estimate the parameters needed to simulate this scheme and to support the
functional forms used to implement it. Unlike previous attempts to calibrate
optimal regulatory mechanisms, the use of panel estimation allows us to gain
some measure of the degree of technological uncertainty facing the regulator
when seeking to ascertain ﬁrms’ costs. Comparisons with a stylised price
cap regime for electricity distribution in England and Wales suggest that
signiﬁcant welfare gains are obtainable (as also conﬁrmed by Gasmi et al.
(1994)), especially when the regulator designs both schemes for almost every
conceivable realisation of the unobserved productivity parameter and the
price elasticity of consumer demand is high.22
Our results are signiﬁcant in the light of the UK debate surrounding price
regulation and the provision of incentives in the utilities, including the focus
22In a sense, we have underestimated the gains from incentive contracts; increasing the
space of characteristics unknown to the principal would be expected to increase these
welfare gains.
25of our study: the electricity industry. As various consultations regarding
electricity distribution price reviews make clear (OFFER (1999a), OFFER
(1999b), OFGEM (2004b)), regulators acknowledge facing notable informa-
tion asymmetries when setting prices (before and after investing consider-
able time and eﬀort to minimise these). It is therefore important to consider
whether beneﬁts might accrue from oﬀering ﬁrms a choice of price-cost com-
binations (in the presence of such asymmetries), as opposed to prescribing a
particular price cap. It is also interesting that the electricity regulator has
proposed a sliding scale to cover the costs of distributors’ capital expendi-
ture (while retaining an overall RPI-X price cap). Given the strengths that
we (and others) have found in optimal price regulation, such developments
appear to have merit; it will be interesting to examine the eﬀects of this
proposal as it is rolled out.
We have compared the sliding scale with a stylised price cap in terms of
their eﬀects on overall economic welfare. Pollitt (2005) (p. 5) lists several ad-
ditional criteria that regulatory proposals should satisfy and it is interesting
to consider brieﬂy how the sliding scale performs against some of these (see
also Bauer et al. (1998); CEPA (2003)). Arguably, the sliding scale scores well
in terms of criteria such as transparency and consistency with economic the-
ory. The robustness of the empirical methodology we have adopted is sound
though (as Pollitt notes) data are not always forthcoming in this area; how-
ever, Pollitt argues for a panel approach to OFGEM’s benchmarking so our
implementation of the sliding scale may satisfy this interpretation of the cri-
terion. Other criteria involve practical relevance, capture of industry-speciﬁc
factors and low regulatory burden. These raise an interesting question about
the optimal mix of ingredients for determining regulated prices. Until now,
we have interpreted the sliding scale as a potential approach to price set-
26ting once the regulator has collected information from the industry. Yet, its
ability to handle asymmetric information suggests that its use might create
the need for less information to be collected. Whilst it is always desirable to
attain a full information outcome, regulatory experience suggests that this
is costly, time-consuming and impossible.23 Thus, implementing the sliding
scale at an earlier stage in the review process may reduce the regulatory
burden compared to OFGEM’s current approach, though possibly at the ex-
pense of capturing some industry-speciﬁc factors. On this interpretation, the
decision to implement a sliding scale relates not only to the potential avail-
ability of welfare gains, but also to the potential trade-oﬀ between these two
objectives.
There are several ways in which our paper would be extended. Some
might be expected to weaken our results while others may strengthen them.
Two complications in the former category are dynamic interaction between
the regulator and the ﬁrm, and the challenges raised by regulating conglomer-
ate utilities. Whilst acknowledging the superiority of sliding scale regulation
in a static single-product context such as ours, Mayer and Vickers (1996) ar-
gue that relaxing these assumptions would favour price capping. The reasons
for this are that cost-sharing dampens cost-reducing incentives so that, in or-
der to achieve the eﬃciencies available under price capping, the regulatory
lag would have to be lengthened which may in turn increase the regulator’s
time inconsistency problem. Meanwhile, multiple cost centres within one
utility make is harder to gain suﬃcient information about the full range of
productivity parameters along which the sliding scale must be deﬁned. In
contrast, the price cap only requires detailed knowledge about the least pro-
23Interestingly, OFGEM’s assessment of its recent distribution price review (OFGEM
(2005)) acknowledges issues in relation to data collection and workload, and considers the
scope for a lower volume consultation exercise in future.
27ductive ﬁrm (although some knowledge of the range is presumably necessary
in order to identify this ﬁrm). These are clearly important areas for future
research.
In other respects, our model may actually have favoured price cap regu-
lation. Thus, for example, we have ignored issues of quality regulation and
the uncertainty about costs or demand that both regulator and ﬁrm might
face after having designed and selected from the sliding scale menu respec-
tively. In the former case, the price cap’s sharp incentives for cost-reduction
are often claimed to be damaging (see Armstrong et al. (1994)), while on the
latter, Burns et al. (1995) suggest that the sliding scale provides for a suit-
able sharing of any risk between the parties. A further issue, raised by the
Utilities Act 2000 concerns distributional matters between the regulated ﬁrm
and its customers. The Act places a prior duty on regulators to design policy
with consumer interests foremost in mind (i.e. to place additional weight on
consumer surplus in our model). This is likely to increase the welfare gains
available from the sliding scale because, as we have seen, it allows regulators
to adjust prices (and eﬀorts) in order to extract rent from the ﬁrm. This
does not happen with price caps, where the need to ensure sustainability of
the ﬁrm guarantees substantial rents in the event that the ﬁrm has low costs.
It seems clear additional research can help identify the most appropriate
method of regulating utilities prices. In the meantime, our results suggest
that sliding scale regulation may prove a useful tool. In addition, we have
shown how a combination of theory and estimation-based simulation may be
useful in evaluating the available regulatory alternatives.
28Appendix
A The First-Best solution
To solve the program in Section 2, let ν ≥ 0 be the shadow price associated
with the IR constraint. Deﬁne the Lagrangian
L(e,q)=B(q) − R(q)+U(e,q)+ν[R(q) − C(e,q) − ψ(e)]
= B(q) − C(e,q) − ψ(e)+ν[R(q) − C(e,q) − ψ(e)] (A.1)




 (q)=( 1+ν)Cq − νR
 (q) (A.3)
CS : νU = 0 (A.4)
Equation (A.2) equates the marginal disutility of eﬀort with its marginal
beneﬁt and, similarly, (A.3) equates the marginal beneﬁt of output with its
marginal cost. Equation (A.4) is the complementary-slackness condition.















where L is the Lerner index and η = −pD /q is the absolute value of the
elasticity of demand. For the IR constraint to be satisﬁed at positive levels
of eﬀort we must have p>C q. Hence, from (A.6), ν>0 and, from the CS
condition, U = 0; i.e. the IR constraint binds. Solving (A.6), U(e,q)=0 ,
p = P(q) gives e, q and p at the First-Best.
B A note on form of the cost function
The numerical implementation of the sliding scale requires functional forms
for D(q)a n df(β). We have already commented on these in the text. In
addition, we have restricted the distributor’s cost function to be linear in
eﬀort and output and the disutility of eﬀort function to ψ(e)=γe2/2. Each
29of these requires comment.
A more general version of (1) than the one we have used would be
C = α +[ β − φ(e)]q (B.7)
where φ(0) = 0,φ   > 0,φ    ≤ 0. Using a more general ψ(e) function and
assuming that the price cap is in place (as does our empirical procedure), a














2 + ··· (B.10)
Equation (B.8) then becomes
b0 + b1e =( a0 + a1e)q (B.11)
with solution e = e(q). Under the assumption that zero eﬀort corresponds




q + terms in q2 and higher
By appropriate choice of units we can put a0 = 1 and in the notation of the
model we have that b1 = γ. Using this, the average variable cost for REC i






+ terms in q2 and higher (B.12)
Our estimation procedure tests (B.12) and ﬁnds no support for including the
quadratic terms in output. Hence, ψ(e)=
γe2
2 and φ(e)=e are consistent
with our data.
C Details of the simulation procedure
We analyse the system of equations in Section 4 using a series of MATLAB
subroutines. The structure of our procedure is as follows:
301. For a given value of U(β)=U solve the equations






ˆ c = β − e
k =
D(p)
D(p)+( p − ˆ c)D (p)
2. Given v = v(U)a n dW(β) = 0, solve the system of diﬀerential equa-
tions (24). This gives trajectories for v as functions of U. In particular
we get U(β)=θ(U).
3. Solve θ(U) = 0 to obtain the initial boundary value U.
D Data sources
At privatization, the electricity industry of England and Wales was organised
into twelve regional electricity companies (RECs) each having an exclusive
licence to distribute electricity to customers in a speciﬁc geographical area.
Measures were taken to ensure that even if the RECs were taken over by new
owners, separate accounts would be kept of the regulated components of the
businesses thereby ensuring a consistent record for regulatory purposes. It is
only since privatization that electricity distribution has been subject to price
capping regulation and, since equation (30) depends on the impact of such
regulation, we are conﬁned to the period since the start of the 1990s for the
cost function estimation.
Two alternative sources of data are available for cost estimation. The
Oﬃce for Electricity Regulation (OFFER—now part of OFGEM) conducted
an analysis of regulatory accounts in the recent review of public electricity
suppliers (OFFER (1999a)) This is a detailed investigation of accounting
procedures and attempts to adjust the accounts for diﬀerences in treatment
of a large number of items. Unfortunately, the analysis only extends back
to 1993, and without detailed information of the sort only available to the
regulator, it is impossible to make appropriate amendments to previous data.
In addition certain procedures adopted by OFFER are disputed by the in-
dustry, so that to date there exists no agreed reconstruction of the accounts.
The alternative is to take the collected raw accounts as made available by the
Centre for Regulated Industries (see Board (1999)). These are available from
1990/91 to 1999/2000, and provide details of distribution operating costs and
31amounts of electricity distributed. This gives a total of ten years of data are
available from this source. In view of the longer data set and minimum con-
sistency imposed by the electricity legislation, we based our analysis of costs
on the published accounts. In all 96 usable observations were available.
Electricity demand data were taken from the Centre for Regulated In-
dustries and Handbooks of Electricity Supply Statistics. GDP data for each
REC area were obtained from Business Strategies Limited (BSL).24 This se-
ries was obtainable back to 1982/83. Therefore, the dataset covers each REC
for the period 1982/83 to 1996/97.25 The nominal electricity prices for each
REC were based on the prices for representative cities within each REC area
taken from various issues of the Digest of UK Energy Statistics (DUKES).
The real electricity prices were computed by deﬂating the nominal prices for
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36Table 1: Electricity average variable distribution cost estimates
Variable C1 C2 C3 C4
Constant 3.2143** 2.1493** 3.9451** 2.6344**
q -12.2925** -4.4067** -16.7358** -6.5532**
q2 14.3202 18.7752*
Time trend 0.0048 -0.0003
No. of REC dums 11 11 11 11
No. of Time dums 9 9
Diagnostics
Degs. of freedom 97 98 105 106
Adjusted R2 0.674 0.671 0.615 0.606
Amemiya pred. -4.42 -4.41 -4.31 -4.29
Akaike info. -1.58 -1.58 -1.47 -1.46
RESET(1) F(1,96) =1 4 .79 F(1,97) =1 3 .62 F(1,104) =3 .85 F(1,105) =3 .74
Normality χ2
2 =1 0 .68 χ2
2 =5 .59 χ2
2 =7 .58 χ2
2 =5 .25
Test of zero restrictions on:
All variables F(22,97) =1 2 .20 F(21,98) =1 2 .53 F(14,105) =1 4 .55 F(13,106) =1 5 .11
REC dums F(11,97) =6 .16 F(11,98) =6 .17 F(11,105) =5 .77 F(11,106) =5 .58
Time dums F(9,97) =3 .08 F(9,98) =3 .19
Notes: [1] All equations are estimated in LIMDEP 7. [2] Time period is 1990/01–
1999/2000. [3] t-statistics and probabilities are based upon standard errors corrected
for heteroskedasticity. [4] * and ** indicate that a coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. [5] Bold type indicates a failure of a
diagnostic test at the 5% level.
37Table 2: Electricity demand model estimates by REC
Variables D1 D2 D3 D4
logh 0.1868** 0.1626** 0.1482** 0.1606**
logp1 -0.2391** -0.0727** -0.1885** -0.2513**
logp2 -0.1319* 0.0703 -0.0911 -0.1640**
logp3 -0.1714** 0.0224 -0.1333** -0.2016**
logp4 -0.1186* 0.0605 -0.0853 -0.1473**
logp5 -0.2280** -0.0282 -0.1836** -0.2555**
logp6 -0.1905** 0.0456 -0.1419* -0.2267**
logp7 -0.1802** 0.0360 -0.1383** -0.2152**
logp8 0.0438 0.2381** 0.0800 -0.0115R
logp9 -0.1644 0.0683 -0.1174 -0.1996**
logp10 -0.0127 0.2218* -0.0435 -0.1220
logp11 -0.1100 0.0786 -0.1309** -0.1959**
logp12 -0.2335** -0.0080 -0.1862** -0.2659**
Time trend 0.0005
logq(−1) 0.7426** 0.7333** 0.7850** 0.7694**
Constant -0.5909** -0.9731** -0.4803** -0.3903**
Dum REC 8:1988/89 0.0279** 0.0277**
Dum REC 10:1984/85 -0.0382** -0.0365**
Dum REC 10:1989/90 0.0271** 0.0289**
Dum REC 10:1990/90 -0.0564** -0.0548**
Dum REC 11:1984/85 0.0279** 0.0278**
Dum REC 11:1989/90 -0.0411** -0.0409**
No. of REC dums 11 11 11 11
No. of Time dums 13 13 13
Diagnostics
Degs. of freedom 129 141 123 124
Adjusted R2 0.998 0.997 0.999 0.999
Amemiya pred. -8.55 -8.22 -8.92 -8.92
Akaike info. -5.72 -5.38 -6.09 -6.09
Error autocorr(1) F(1,117) =3 .52 F(1,128) =1 0 .05 F(1,111) =2 .08 F(1,112) =1 .87
RESET(1) F(1,128) =2 .00 F(1,140) =4 .41 F(1,122) =1 .67 F(1,123) =0 .62
Normality χ2
2 =1 2 .21 χ2
2 =3 .37 χ2
2 =0 .08 χ2
2 =0 .48
Test of zero restrictions on:
All variables F(38,129) = 2260.6 F(26,141) = 2223.7 F(44,123) = 2897.9 F(43,124) = 2652.4
REC dums F(11,129) =2 .76 F(11,141) =2 .36 F(11,123) =3 .30 F(11,124) =3 .22
Time dums F(13,129) =6 .21 F(13,123) =9 .27 F(13,124) =1 2 .67
Test of coeﬃcient restrictions:
Against D3 F(6,168) =1 5 .56 F(1,168) =2 .26
Notes: [1] All equations are estimated in LIMDEP 7. [2] Time period is 1982/83–1996/97.
[3] t-statistics and probabilities are based upon standard errors corrected for heteroskedas-
ticity. [4] * and ** indicate that a coeﬃcient is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the
10% and 5% levels respectively. [5] ‘R’ for REC 8 (in D4) indicates a constrained
coeﬃcient—see Section 5.2.2. [6] Bold type indicates a failure of a diagnostic test at the
5% level. [7] The absolute values of the estimated long-run price elasticities are given in
Table 3 (column 8). [8] The estimated long-run income elasticities are 0.73, 0.61, 0.69
and 0.70 for models D1, D2, D3 and D4 respectively.
38Table 3: Summary of parameter values
REC bi s.e. Range 1 Range 2 γη i Ai zi αi
(95% c.i.) (99% c.i.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1 2.58 0.30 2.00 3.17 1.81 3.36 1.50 1.09 3.27 5.6 0.78
2 2.32 0.26 1.80 2.84 1.63 3.01 1.50 0.71 2.48 5.6 0.60
3 2.73 0.40 1.94 3.53 1.68 3.79 1.50 0.87 3.96 5.6 1.18
4 2.19 0.18 1.82 2.56 1.70 2.67 1.50 0.64 1.74 5.9 0.58
5 3.00 0.45 2.11 3.89 1.82 4.18 1.50 1.11 4.91 5.5 0.82
6 2.64 0.36 1.93 3.35 1.70 3.58 1.50 0.98 3.73 5.7 0.93
7 2.61 0.35 1.90 3.31 1.68 3.54 1.50 0.93 3.64 5.7 0.87
8 2.03 0.16 1.72 2.34 1.62 2.44 1.50 0.05 1.13 6.0 0.63
9 2.19 0.25 1.68 2.69 1.52 2.85 1.50 0.87 2.70 6.3 0.72
10 2.48 0.33 1.83 3.12 1.62 3.33 1.50 0.53 2.87 5.9 0.63
11 2.14 0.21 1.72 2.57 1.58 2.70 1.50 0.85 2.15 6.0 0.46
12 2.63 0.32 1.99 3.28 1.78 3.48 1.50 1.15 3.69 5.6 0.73
Notes: Input price (z) is in pence/kWh and is deﬁned for REC i as zi = pi−di,
where pi is the consumer price of electricity and di is the distribution price.
A unit of output (A)i si n1 0 10 kWh/year. Thus, if p1 =7 .3p/kWh, annual
revenue for REC 1 would be d1 × q1 =( p1 − z1) × A1 × p
−1.09
1 × 1010 =
1.7 × 3.27 × 7.3−1.09 × 1010pence ≈ £64m. Further, αi above, and rent and
transfers in the ﬁgures that follow, are measured in £102m per year.
39Table 4: Welfare gains from the sliding scale







































Figure 1: Sliding Scale for REC1. 95% c.i. for β. NOTE: Units for all
graphs are: distribution price, p/kWh; cost and rent, £100m per year.

























Figure 2: Transfer for REC1. 95% c.i. for β





































Figure 3: Rent and Eﬀort for REC1. 95% c.i. for β.







































Figure 4: Distribution Prices for REC1. 95% c.i. for β.
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